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SARGENT v. ROSS: ABROGATION OF LANDLORD'S
TORT IMMUNITY
In Sargent v. Ross,' the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ex-
plicitly abrogated the firmly established common law rule that a land-
lord is not liable, except in certain limited situations,2 for injuries caused
by defective or dangerous conditions on leased premises: 8 "We
think now is the time for the landlord's limited tort immunity to be
relegated to the history books where it more properly belongs."4  In
sustaining a jury verdict that the defendant landlord was liable for
the wrongful death of a child caused by a fall from an outside stairway
servicing a second-story apartment, the court held that landlords, like
other persons, must exercise reasonable care to avoid subjecting others
to an unreasonable risk of harm5 and that the general standard of tort
liability for negligence would henceforth govern the landlord-tenant re-
lationship.0
The parent of the deceased child brought suit against the child's
babysitter, a tenant, for negligent supervision and against the babysit-
ter's landlord, who occupied the ground floor apartment, for negligent
construction and maintenance of the stairway. The cause of the acci-
dent was found to be the dangerously steep incline of the stairway and
a railing insufficient to prevent a child from falling over the side.7
At trial the jury rendered a verdict for the defendant babysitter on
1. N.H. ,308 A.2d 528 (1973).
2. See notes 26-34 infra and accompanying text.
3. Id. at ,308 A.2d at 533. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 534. According to the court, the inquiry would be
whether the lessor owed a duty to the lessee, whether he met the standards of that
duty, and, if he did not, whether his breach was the proximate cause of the injury.
Id. at , 308 A.2d at 534-35.
6. The court stated that the standard of care imposed on the landlord would be
determined by all the circumstances "including the likelihood of injury to others, the
probable seriousness of such injury and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk."
Id. at , 308 A.2d at 534.
7. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 530. The court pointed out that the landlord should
have anticipated the use by children of the stairs, which were added to the building
eight years previously. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 535.
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the ground that her actions did not constitute negligence. s However,
as to the defendant landlord, the plaintiff prevailed. The jury ap-
parently reasoned that the landlord had retained control of the stairs;'
therefore, she had owed a duty to exercise reasonable care and had
breached that duty. 10 The landlord excepted to the denial of her mo-
tions for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and setting aside of the verdict, claiming that there was
no evidence that she had either retained control of the premises or con-
cealed the defect." The trial judge reserved all questions of law and
transferred the case to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 2
After determining that the evidence in the case did not support the
trial jury's finding that the landlord had retained control of the stairs, 13
the supreme court sounded the death knell for landlord tort immun-
ity in New Hampshire by nonetheless applying the general tort stand-
ard of reasonable care.14 Affirming the jury's -finding that the land-
lord had negligently constructed the stairs,' 5 the court entered judg-
ment for the plaintiff.
The entire landlord-tenant relationship, including the landlord's
liability in tort for injuries sustained because of a dangerous or defec-
tive condition in the leased premises, has long been governed by
strict application of the doctrine of caveat emptor, "let the buyer be-
8. Id. at ,308 A.2d at 530.
9. This finding was apparently made in spite of the fact that the stairs served
only one apartment. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 531-32.
10. Under a traditional analysis, an initial inquiry in determining a landlord's lia-
bility for a defective condition is whether he has retained control over the area, rather
than whether he has met a standard of reasonable care either in discovering and rem-
edying the condition or in notifying the lessee of its existence. See notes 17-19 infra
and accompanying text. A finding that the landlord has not retained such control
would end the inquiry into the landlord's negligence if no other exceptions to
this general tort immunity for landlords were applicable (see notes 28-34 infra)
and would necessitate reversal of a jury verdict against a landlord who had relinquished
control.
In Sargent, however, the jury found affirmatively on the issue of control, id. at
308 A.2d at 530, and thus proceeded under the general tort standard of reasonable
care, id. at , 308 A.2d at 531-32, the standard which applies under traditional land-
lord-tenant tort law once retention of control by the landlord is found. See, e.g., Trem-
bley v. Donnelly, 103 N.H. 498, 175 A.2d 391 (1961).
11. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 530. Concealment of a known defect, like retention
of control, is another common exception to the general rule of landlord tort immunity.
See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 532.
14. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 534.
15. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 535. Both the plaintiff and the defendant tenant
testified at trial that the steps were too steep, and the jury bad the benefit of a view.
Id. at ,308 A.2d at 535. See note 10 supra.
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ware.' 1 6  Imposition of this principle led to the development of
three general rules governing the landlord's tort liability. First, the
principles of tort law which imposed liability for failure to use reason-
able care17 were held inapplicable to the realty lessor with respect to
injuries sustained by the lessee or the lessee's invitees because of a de-
fective condition in the leased premises;' 8 the landlord's primary
16. See, e.g., Lowe v. Payne, 107 Neb. 378, 383, 186 N.W. 320, 322 (1922). The
Lowe court held that where control passes to the lessee, the rule of caveat emptor
applies to leases of real estate. Therefore, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or conceal-
ment, the lessee assumes the duty to examine the premises with respect to safety and
suitability for his business. See Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers Ice Co., 114 Ark.
532, 539, 170 S.W. 241, 243 (1914); Fantacone v. McQueen, 196 Cal. App. 2d 477,
479 n.1, 16 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 n.1 (1961); Hassell v. Denning, 84 Cal. App. 479,
481-82, 258 P. 426, 426-27 (1927); Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 306, 179
A.2d 592, 595 (1962); Griffin v. Freeborn, 181 Mo. App. 203, 206, 168 S.W. 219,
220 (1914); Slabe v. Beyer, 149 A.2d 788, 789 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959); Robinson
v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732, 736, 94 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1956); Lapp v. Rogers, Ore.
, 510 P.2d 551, 552-53 (1973); Auer v. Vahl, 129 Wis. 635, 109 N.W. 529,
530 (1906); 4D PERSONAL INJuRY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES 258-323, (L. Fru-
mer et al. eds. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356 (1965).
Since the lessee was thought to be an individual who could carefully evaluate the
premises by inspection, caveat emptor applied where an alleged defective condition was
discoverable. However, if it was not discoverable and the landlord knew of the de-
fect, his nondisclosure was actionable and caveat emptor was considered inapplicable.
See, e.g., Shotwell v. Bloom, 60 Cal. App. 2d 303, 140 P.2d 728 (1943); James, Tort
Risks of Land Ownership: How Affected by Lease or Sale, 28 CONN. B.J. 127, 128-
33 (1954). See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
In addition, the lessee was free to seek by negotiation any warranty as to the
condition of the premises. This alternative was based on the assumptions that both
parties were aware of the applicability of caveat emptor in the absence of a warranty
agreement and that equal bargaining strength was present. However,
[i]f, instead of exacting from the lessor any warranty of the present or future
state of repair, the lessee elects to rely on his own judgment, the law, except
in the case of fraud or concealment on the part of the lessor, leaves the lessee
to the operation of the maxim caveat emptor; he takes the premises as he
finds them, for better or for worse. Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord,
26 MICH. L. REv. 260, 262 (1928).
17. "No better general rule can be made than that the courts will find a duty
where, in general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists." W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 327 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g.,
McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); Routh v.
Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942).
18. The rule seems to be well settled that, in the absence of any secret defect
or deceit or warranty or agreement on the part of the landlord to repair, the
tenant takes the leased premises in the condition they happen to be in at the
time of the leasing, and that in such case the landlord is not liable to the ten-
ant for an injury caused by the premises' being out of repair during the term.
Cole v. MeKey, 66 Wis. 500, 505-06, 29 N.W. 279, 280 (1886).
For a more graphic statement of this general rule of landlord tort immunity, see Awad
v. McColgan, 357 Mich. 386, 390, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (1959), where the court stated:
"A tenant may rent tumble-down property if he wishes and if it does in fact tumble
down during his occupancy, the landlord 'without more' is not liable." See also Larson
v. Straff, 340 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1965); City of Fairbanks v. Schailble, 375 P.2d 201
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obligation under a lease was to give complete possession and control
of the premises to the tenant, free from any interference."0 Second,
since the lessor had no duty to lease the premises, and the lessee had a
duty to inspect them,20 the lessee could not demand that the property
be in any particular condition or be suitable for any particular purpose,
including habitation.2" Third, since the landlord did not have a duty
to deliver the premises in a particular condition and since a lease was
considered contractual in nature, 22 the lessor, in the absence of an ex-
press agreement to the contrary, had no obligation to repair defects
either existing at the time of the making of the lease or arising during
the lease term. 23
The basic rationale underlying all these general rules was that a
lease was equivalent to a sale:24 the lessor was deemed to be in the
(Alas. 1962); Burks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 344 P.2d 301 (1959); Epperson
v. Mendes, 141 Cal. App. 2d 581, 297 P.2d 141 (1956); Wiley v. Dow, 107 So. 2d
166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Whitehouse v. Lorch, 347 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1961);
Swingler v. Robinson, 321 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. CL App. 1959); Harkrider, supra note 16,
at 263; 4D PERSoNAL INJURY, supra note 16, at 341.
19. See, e.g., Hannah v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930). See
also Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRD. L. REv. 225, 228 (1969); Note,
Landlord's Duty To Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View
from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEo. L.J 1153, 1156 (1971).
20. The lessee's "duty to inspect" is a duty of self-protection, see Harkrider, supra
note 16, at 260-63, since his recovery may depend on whether he could reasonably
have known of the defect. See, e.g., Strothman v. Houggy, 186 Pa. Super. 638, 142
A.2d 769 (1958) (tenant takes premises as he finds them, and landlord is not liable
for existing defect of which tenant knows or can become aware by reasonable inspec-
tion). See also Jones v. United States, 241 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1957) (under Maryland
law, where defect is open and obvious, duty to protect a child is on parent-tenant,
not landlord); Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal. 2d 443, 347 P.2d 641, 24 Cal. Rptr. 681
(1962); Brandt v. Yaeger, 57 Del. 326, 199 A.2d 768 (1964) (burden normally on
tenant to prove lack of knowledge of latent defect to make a case for an exception
to caveat emptor); RESTATFhmNT, supra note 16, § 358.
21. See, e.g., Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers Ice Co., 114 Ark. 532, 170 S.W.
241 (1914); Valin v. Jewell, 88 Conn. 151, 90 A. 36 (1914); Ciskoski v. Michalsen,
19 I1. App. 2d 327, 152 N.E.2d 479 (1958); Griffin v. Freeborn, 181 Mo. App. 203,
168 S.W. 219 (1914); Lowe v. Payne, 107 Neb. 378, 186 N.W. 320 (1922); Dwyer
v. Woollard, 205 App. Div. 546, 199 N.Y.S. 840 (1923).
22. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 58, 62-63 (1809).
23. See, e.g., Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707, 712 (1887) (dictum); Schur-
man v. American Stores Co., 145 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1944); McKenzie v. Atlantic
Manor, Inc., 181 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Divines v. Dickinson, 189
Iowa 194, 174 N.W. 8 (1919); Hines v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 161, 33 S.W. 914,
916-17 (1896). See also 2 F. HA"sn & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.16(2),
at 1514-15 (1956).
24. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 58, 62 (1809); Logsdon v. Central Dev.
Ass'n, 273 Mo. App. 499, 506, 123 S.W.2d 631, 636 (1938); Pines v. Perssion, 14
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position of a seller of real property-he was the seller of property for a
term of years. His nonliability in tort resulted from the fact that he
relinquished control of the premises, that very control which is a pre-
requisite to the imposition of tort liability. The rule of "caveat lessee"
may have been based in part on practical reality. Cases upholding
the traditional application of caveat emptor to the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship have noted that the doctrine's particular features were developed
in an agrarian society where the land itself was the primary object and
value of the lease. Buildings on the land were often not only incidental,
but also more simple in design and thus easier to inspect. As a re-
sult, both the lessor and the lessee could enter into an agreement with
equal awareness of the condition of the premises. 25 Additionally, an
owner of property in a run-down condition might hesitate to rent it if
he were liable for injuries resulting from defects in the premises. How-
ever, the property in poor repair might serve as an adequate, per-
haps even desirable, residence for a person able to pay only a small
rent, particularly if such person had the authority and ability to repair
the property while living there.
Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
One taking a lease of property stands in the position of a purchaser, who can
and is bound to inspect the property, and is consequently subject to the rule
of caveat emptor. It results that there is no implied warranty by the lessor as
to the condition of the premises, and the lessee cannot ordinarily complain
that they were not, at the beginning of the tenancy, in a tenable condition,
or were not adapted for the purposes for which they were leased. 1 H. Tir-
FANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 99 (3d ed. 1939).
See also Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the
Premises, 62 HIv. L. Rav. 669 (1949); Note, Landlord and Tenant: Defects Existing
at the Time of the Lease, 35 IND. L.J. 361 (1960).
Consistent with the sale concept, a person who is leasing and is in control of
property is deemed to be the owner so far as the public and third persons are con-
cemed. Thus, in cases of injuries caused through the use or condition of the prem-
ises, the tenant is liable. See Kelley v. Laclede Real Estate & Inv. Co., 348 Mo. 407,
155 S.W.2d 90 (1941); Jacobs v. Mutual Mortgage & Inv. Co., 6 Ohio St. 2d 92, 216
N.E.2d 49 (1966); Kingsul Theatres v. Quillen, 29 Tenn. App. 248, 196 S.W.2d 316
(1946); Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W.2d 723 (1942)
(also holding landlord liable to injured third party because landlord reserved a right
of entry to make repairs and could reasonably have discovered the defect). See also
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 351 (4th ed. 1971); James,
Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE
L.. 605 (1954).
25. Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-77, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Kline v.
Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
266 (1960), where it is stated that property law is "shaped by distinctions whose va-
lidity is largely historical." See also Quinn & Phillips, supra note 19, at 227, where
the background of landlord-tenant law is graphically stated:
To comprehend the law it is helpful to envision the tenant leaning on a fence
at twilight, watching his fields and waiting the call to dinner. It is against
this simple background that landlord and tenant law took the shape it has es-
sentially retained to this day.
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Several widely recognized exceptions to the general rule of land-
lord immunity have developed, imposing liability on the landlord
for injuries in certain circumstances.26 The first of these exceptions
was the lessor's duty to disclose any hidden defects of which he was
aware and which were not obvious to the lessee. 7  Second, since the
landlord's lack of control was the foundation for his nonliability, 28
a major exception developed for injuries caused by negligence attribut-
able to a portion of the premises over which the landlord retained con-
trol.2 1 In addition, liability could attach to a landlord who statutor-
26. The exceptions have been summarized in a variety of ways. The court in Sar-
gent stated:
[A] landlord is now generally conceded to be liable in tort for injuries result-
ing from defective and dangerous conditions in the premises if the injury is
attributable to (1) a hidden danger in the premises of which the landlord but
not the tenant is aware, (2) premises leased for public use, (3) premises re-
tained under the landlord's control, such as common stairways, or (4) prem-
ises negligently repaired by the landlord. N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 531.
Professor Powell lists six exceptions to the doctrine of landlord tort immunity: (1)
the fraudulent concealment of a dangerous condition existing at the time of leasing,
(2) the retention of control over the area causing the injury, (3) the negligent making
of repairs, (4) the failure to repair under an agreement to repair, (5) the failure to
repair under a statutory duty to repair, and (6) the recoupment of money paid under
a judgment against the lessee where he has been held liable as the possessor of the
land when the landlord could also have been held liable under one of the exceptions.
2 R. POWEL , THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 234[2], at 332-33 (P. Rohan ed. 1973).
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§ 358-62.
27. See, e.g., Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.W. 11 (1913); Hines
v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S.W. 914 (1896).
28. See, e.g., the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y.
287, 290, 176 N.E. 397, 398 (1931), which, in denying landlord liability, categorized
tort liability as "an incident to occupation or control."
29. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 290, 176 N.E. 397, 398 (1931); Yaeger v.
Parkgate Realty Co., 88 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 22 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 179 N.E.2d 156 (Ct.
App. 1962). See, e.g., Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 772 (1962); Morgan v. Garris, 167 A.2d 794 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961); Sol-
lars v. Blayney, 31 Ill. App. 2d 341, 176 N.E.2d 477 (1961); Wright & Taylor, Inc.
v. Smith, 315 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. 1958); Finn v. Peters, 340 Mass. 622, 165 N.E.2d
896 (1960). See also 4D PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 16, at 277-90; 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 23, § 27.17, which states:
The duty owed by a landlord to his tenants and their visitors with respect to
common hallways, approaches and the like, which the landlord retains in his
possession for the use of the tenants, is sharply different from the duty owed
with reference to the leased premises themselves; it is the full duty of reason-
able pare to make conditions reasonably safe and includes the obligation of
care to discover unknown perils, as well as to remedy known ones.
The fact that the question of control is so often discussed in the modem cases
may well be the result of the increase in the number of multiple-unit dwellings, which
by definition have portions retained in the control of the lessor. Control was clearly
not often significant in the lease of a single-unit dwelling because the lessor usually
retained no control over any part of the premises. This change in the degree of con-
trol retained may in itself suggest that the existing rules dealing with the liability of
landlords need re-examination.
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ily30 or contractually3' became obligated to make repairs or to main-
tain the premises in a certain condition and who then either failed to
perform such a duty or performed it negligently.2 In one specific
situation-the short-term rental of a furnished dwelling-it became
widely assumed that the lessor had impliedly contracted to deliver the
premises in a habitable condition.3  Finally, liability for negligence
was not barred in cases where the premises were leased for a public
purpose. 4 While these exceptions resulted in potential lessor liability
30. Many states impose a statutory duty on the landlord to keep the premises in
repair. The statutes can be divided into three groups according to the remedies they
provide. Note, Landlord and Tenant, supra note 24, at 370-72. The first type provides
that the tenant may make the repair or vacate the premises. See, e.g., CAL. CIvIL
CODE § 1941 (West 1954); id. 8H 1941.1-.2, 1942.1-.5 (West Supp. 1973); MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. H8 42-201 to -202 (1961). The second type of statute provides for
enforcement of the duty to repair by either imposition of fines and jail sentences or
civil recovery by the city, but does not expressly provide for a private tort remedy
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 19-343 (1969); id. § 19-347 (Supp. 1973); IowA
CODE § 413.66, .108 (1949); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 83.330 (1969); MAss. ANN.
LAWs ch. 144, §§ 66, 89 (1972); N.Y. MuLTiPLE DWELLING LAW § 78 (McKinney
1946); id. § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The courts have split on whether a private
action against the landlord can be inferred from the type of statute which creates no
express tort remedy. Compare Daniels v. Brunton, 9 N.J. Super. 294, 76 A.2d 73
(1950), ajf'd, 7 N.J. 102, 80 A.2d 547 (1951) and Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16,
134 N.E. 703 (1922) and Moore v. Bryant, 27 Misc. 2d 22, 83 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1948),
with Johnson v. Carter, 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934) and Garland v. Stetson,
292 Mass. 95, 197 N.E. 679 (1935). The third type expressly provides a remedy in
tort. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 88 61-111 to -112 (1966); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts.
670, 2322, 2692-93, 2695 (West 1952); MICH. CoMP. Lows § 125.471 (1967); id. §
125.536 (Supp. 1973). See generally Feuerstein & Shestack, Landlord and Tenant-
The Statutory Duty To Repair, 45 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1950). Many courts, however,
have required that the landlord have actual or constructive notice before liability can
be imposed. See, e.g., Fogarty v. M.J. Beuchler & Son, Inc., 124 Conn. 325, 199 A.
550 (1938); Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719 (1950).
31. See, e.g., Jones v. Regan, 169 Cal. App. 2d 635, 337 P.2d 889 (1959); Molden-
hauer v. Krynski, 62 Ill. App. 382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965); Farley v. Yerman, 231
Md. 444, 190 A.2d 773 (1963).
32. See, e.g., Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1964); Barclay Woolen
COrp. v. W.E. Hulton Dyeing Co., 220 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Southern Apart-
ments, Inc. v. Emmett, 269 Ala. 584, 114 So. 2d 453 (1959); Coates v. Dewoskin, 379
S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Robinson v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 723, 94 S.E.2d 911
(1956).
33. See, e.g., Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A.2d 26 (1922) (lease must
be of short duration); Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947);
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Collins v. Hopkins, [1923]
2 K.B. 617.
34. See, e.g., Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 420 P.2d 580 (1967);
Corrigan v. Antupit, 131 COnn. 71, 37 A.2d 697 (1944); Blair v. Berlo Vending Corp.,
Del. , 287 A.2d 696 (1972); Lyman v. Hermann, 203 Minn. 225, 280 N.W.
862 (1938); Brown v. Reorganization Inv. Co., 166 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1942); Junker-
man v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N,E. 190 (1915); Hamilton v. Union
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in certain circumstances, none challenged the general application of
caveat emptor to the landlord-tenant relationship.
Outside the law of torts, however, this general applicability has
been eroded to some extent in recent years by cases finding an im-
plied warranty of habitability in dwelling-lease transactions. In 1961
the Wisconsin Supreme Court became the first court to find such a
warranty of habitability in Pines v. Perssion.35  In Pines, the Wiscon-
sin court determined that the general principle-namely, that the
lessee takes the premises as he finds them-is at odds with the
social policy judgments inherent in various state legislative and
-administrative rules,"0 which in turn were based on a rejection of the
doctrine of caveat emptor3 7  Other courts have subsequently found
an implied warranty of habitability on the basis of the presumed in-
tent of the parties to a dwelling lease. 8 Finally, in one such case,
Oil Co., 339 P.2d 440 (Ore. 1959). See generally Note, Lessors Duty To Repair,
supra note 24, at 671.
35. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
36. Id. at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
37. Rather than relying on a particular statute, the Pines court reasoned that where
statutes impose duties on the landlord and thus operate in derogation of the caveat
emptor doctrine and its resultant rules, these duties represent a legislative determination
to alter the basic framework of the landlord-tenant relationship. Id. The plaintiff
had relied upon legislation, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 234.17 (1957), which provided that
a lessee may surrender the leased premises when the property becomes unfit for occu-
pancy without incurring liability for rent. The court, however, expressed doubt
that the section applied under the facts of the case. 14 Wis. 2d at 594, 111 N.W.2d
at 412.
38. In Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), the Supreme Court
of New Jersey found an implied warranty in the general intent of the parties to an
apartment lease. The tenant in Marini offset against his rent the cost of repairing
a cracked toilet in his apartment after the landlord had refused to repair it. The land-
lord then brought an action to dispossess the tenant for failure to pay rent. Holding for
the defendant lessee on the basis of an implied warranty, the court pointed out that
the warranty could only be implied from the parties' intentions, which the landlord
and tenant had failed to express in the agreement. Id. at 143, 265 A.2d at 533.
The extent to which the intention of the parties was the basis for the court's de-
cision was obfuscated somewhat by the fact that, in reaching its decision, the court
relied on Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), which
noted a statute, N.J STAT. ANN. 55:13A-1 et seq. (1971), imposing upon the landlord
a duty to repair leased premises. 56 NJ. 130, 142-43, 265 A.2d 526, 532-33 (1970).
The court in Reste Realty had reasoned that the statutory duty to repair was a persua-
sive argument for imposing an implied warranty of habitability, since the statute altered
the role of caveat emptor. Indeed, the Marini court made no effort to conceal its
indifference with respect to the primary basis for its holding: "It is a mere matter
of semantics whether we designate this covenant one 'to repair' or 'of habitability and
livability fitness.'" Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534. It nonetheless remains that the intent
of the parties played an important role in the court's decision in the Marini case. See
also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
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Lemle v. Breeden,39 the court denied the continuing existence of the
policies out of which the caveat emptdr doctrine had grown and di-
rectly questioned the doctrine's validity.40 In 1971, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire joined in this growing erosion of caveat emp-
tor when, in Kline v. Burns,4 it too rejected the traditional rule that
there is no implied warranty of habitability in the lease of an apart-
ment. Kline was an action by a tenant to recover all rent paid during
his occupancy because the premises were in violation of a city housing
code. Since the New Hampshire court in Kline based its holding in
part on the fact that the state legislature had allowed cities to establish
and enforce minimum housing standards, Kline arguably represented
a less direct attack on the doctrine of caveat emptor than the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Lemle. Nonetheless, the
Kline court indicated that it viewed the concept of caveat emptor as a
remnant of the feudal system and an anachronism in present society.4"
U.S. 925 (1970) (implied warranty based, in part, on expectations of parties to the
contract); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Iil. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
39. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). For cases citing the Lemle decision
with approval, see Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Mease v. Fox, Iowa , 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway, Mass. , 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Mooreland, 495 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919
(Mun. Ct. 1972).
40. In Lemle the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that various exceptions had de-
veloped to prevent the operation of the caveat emptor doctrine in certain circumstances.
See notes 26-34 supra and accompanying text. The court specifically pointed to the
exception holding that the general rule against any implied warranty of habitability
is inapplicable to a furnished dwelling rented for a short term. Id. at 431, 462 P.2d
at 473. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. According to the Lemle court,
the exception for short-term, furnished dwellings was plainly a method of keeping cav-
eat emptor from working under a special circumstance where the doctrine would tend
to produce results contrary to the parties' expectations upon entering into the lease
contract; under this approach, the furnishings and short term of the lease demonstrated
the expectation that the premises would be suitable for immediate use. Id. Finally,
the court flatly stated that an "exception" method of dealing with the effects of caveat
emptor is "artificial" and that "it is the general rule of caveat emptor which must
be re-examined." Id. at 432, 462 P.2d at 473. In holding that a warranty of habita-
bility was generally inherent in leases of realty, the Lemle court emphasized the con-
tractual nature of a lease and the trend toward implying warranties in the sale of chat-
tels. Id. at 430-32, 462 P.2d at 473.
41. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
42. Id. at 90-91, 276 A.2d at 250-51. Under the feudal system, the court noted,
the major value of the lease was the land itself, and buildings were of simple design
and easily repairable by the tenants themselves. In modem times, on the other hand,
the real value bargained for is not the land but "the right to enjoy the building thereon
as a place in which to live." Id. at 91, 276 A.2d at 251.
In upholding the appellant's contention that caveat emptor was no longer applica-
ble in present society, the court relied on the principle that courts must reevaluate old
common law doctrines in the light of current social policy considerations where the
factual basis for the original doctrine no longer exists. Id. The court cited as support
for this principle a recent District of Columbia case which found an implied warranty
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Additionally, the court found that an implied warranty was justified
for three reasons: (1) the landlord of an urban apartment had a bet-
ter knowledge of the conditions of the premises than the tenants, whose
inspection would usually be ineffectual; (2) it was appropriate that the
landlord, who retained ownership of the property and any permanent
improvements after the expiration of the lease term, bear the cost of re-
pairs necessary to make the premises safe; and (3) under present market
conditions, the landlord generally has a superior bargaining position.4"
In all, courts in eleven jurisdictions have now found an implied
warranty of habitability in the dwelling lease context. 44  However, al-
though many of the courts finding such a warranty have criticized the
doctrine of caveat emptor,4 5 the general rule of tort immunity for land-
lords remained intact prior to Sargent.48
of habitability and which criticized the traditional rule rejecting such a warranty. Id.,
citing Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); see Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 111-12 & n.25 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (imposing upon the landlord a common law duty to maintain safe prem-
ises under circumstances virtually identical to those required to trigger the caveat emp-
for exception for short-term leases of furnished dwellings).
43. 111 N.H. at 92, 276 A.2d at 251. The reasons stated by the court provide
a good summary of those points most often relied on by courts which have found an
implied warranty of habitability. See notes 35-40 supra & note 44 infra and accom-
panying text.
The fact that the New Hampshire Supreme Court remanded the case for a deter-
mination of whether the violations of the housing code constituted a material breach
of the implied warranty indicated that a violation of the housing code was not consid-
ered a per se violation of the implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 93-94, 276 A.2d
at 252; cf. Reese v. Diamond Housing Corp., 259 A.2d 112 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
44. Since the Pines decision in Wisconsin, courts in ten additional jurisdictions
(District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio) have found implied warranties in the lease
of dwelling units. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacAr-
thur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, Iowa , 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway, Mass. , 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Glyco v.
Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972). See also Gable v.
Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that an implied warranty
of fitness and merchantability extended to the purchaser of a condominium from its
builder). See generally Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Housing Leases,
21 DRAmm L. REv. 300, 302-10 (1972).
It is interesting to note that the time lapse in the adoption of the implied war-
ranty of habitability by additional jurisdictions is very similar to the time lapse in the
abrogation of the tort immunities. See note 61 infra.
45. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
46. A Shepardization of the cases from the various jurisdictions finding an implied
warranty of habitability (see note 44 supra) indicates that no case in any of these
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In Sargent,47 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that
landlords owed a duty of reasonable care to avoid subjecting others
to an unreasonable risk of harm;48 in so holding, the court rejected the
jurisdictions has extended the implied warranty theory in order to abrogate the general
tort immunity of landlords. Language in Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), might be read as extending the holding in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), to impose an ordi-
nary negligence standard for landlord liability on the basis of the District of Columbia
Housing Code, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-228, 5-103 to -933 (1967), as amended (Supp. IV,
1971). However, the court in Williams v. Auerbach, 285 A.2d 701 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972), subsequently indicated that this portion of Clarke was dictum since the Clarke
plaintiff's theory of recovery, which was sustained on appeal, was that the landlord's agent
had been negligent in installing the equipment that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. at
703. The court further stated that Javins was not dispositive of the issue in Williams be-
cause the plaintiffs in Javins lived in multiple-family dwelling units whereas the Williams
plaintiff lived in a single-family dwelling which was not covered by the District of
Columbia Housing Code. Id. at 704. Thus the Clarke decision cannot be seen as
abrogating the general rule of landlord tort immunity.
New Jersey, a jurisdiction which adopted the implied warranty of habitability in
dwelling leases generally, has nonetheless subsequently upheld the general rule of land-
lord tort immunity. See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), dis-
cussed in note 38 supra. Prior to the decision in Marini, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958), had noted
that the general rule of tort immunity applied in that jurisdiction and that New Jersey's
statutory duty to repair was merely an exception. While the New Jersey statute did
not expressly grant a remedy in tort to an injured lessee for damages resulting from
the lessor's breach of his statutory duty, the court held that a cause of action existed
and that a general negligence standard would apply once a duty to repair was estab-
lished in a particular case. Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 253 A.2d 167 (1969),
then explicitly held that the statutory duty imposed on the landlord of an apartment
could not be used as an absolute exception to the general rule of tort immunity since
it applied only to a building with three or more units. In Coleman the defendant
landlord was not subject to the statutory duty because his building consisted of only
two units. Coleman thus demonstrated that liability under the statute did not subject
a landlord to liability generally and that the rule of caveat emptor still applied to the
landlord-tenant relationship. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of New Jersey suggested
that if the jury, on remand, were to find the defendant landlord negligent for failing
to maintain reasonably safe conditions, tort liability might arise under the retained
control exception. Id. at 65-66, 253 A.2d at 171-72, citing Thompson v. Paseo Manor
South, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
In Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App.
Div. 1973), a New Jersey tribunal was presented with the argument that the implied
warranty of habitability established by Marini altered the analytical framework of the
landlord-tenant relationship sufficiently to impose upon the landlord a standard of strict
liability without negligence for a breach of the statutory duty to repair. The court,
however, rejected this contention and held that the new development did not change
the "principles of law applicable to tort actions for personal injuries by tenants versus
landlords." Id. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466.
47. N.H. , 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
48. "A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances
including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries,
and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Id. at , 308 A.2d at 534.
Vol. 1974:1751
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
rule of "caveat lessee" and the doctrine of landlord immunity in tort.
"Justifiable dissatisfaction '49 with the rule of landlord tort immunity,
the court stated, compelled reevaluation of this principle in light of
present-day circumstances. 50 The court rejected the issues as framed
by the parties, refusing to apply the rule or broaden one of the existing
exceptions. 51 The court indicated that the result of an "orthodox
analysis" of the issues as presented at trial would be "both illogical
and intolerable, particularly since neither party then would have any
legal reason to remedy or take precautionary measures with respect
to dangerous conditions." 52  Pointing out that other immunities from
tort liability have been "giving way" in many jurisdictions, 3 the New
Hampshire tribunal held that the landlord's tort immunity should be
49. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 531, quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
23, § 27.16, at 1510.
50. Although the Sargent court did not explain the conditions of agrarian England
which it claimed had fostered the "caveat lessee" rule, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire had previously described these conditions in Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87,
276 A.2d 248 (1971). See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the Sargent court noted that "courts and legislatures alike are begin-
ning to reevaluate the rigid rules of landlord-tenant law in light of current needs and
principles of law from related areas." N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 530. The case
of Willcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 548-49, 46 S.W. 297, 299 (1898), was cited as
an early example of the application of tort law principles to the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. The Willcox court held a lessor liable for defects that he could reasonably
have discovered at the time of leasing and not just for those defects of which he had ac-
tual knowledge; however, the court's opinion was limited to a redefinition of the land-
lord's disclosure requirement and did not address itself generally to the landlord's tort
liability.
51. The defendant-appellant contended that since there was no evidence that the
accident fit within one of the exceptions to the landlord immunity rule, she should
not be held liable. The plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the traditional rule,
but rather attempted to show that the landlord had retained control of the stairway
or had negligently repaired the premises and was therefore liable under an exception.
N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 530. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
52. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 532. While this result would not occur in all cases,
the conclusion was realistic in light of the facts, since a structural defect was the prox-
imate cause of the accident. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. The tenant
did not have authority under the lease to make a major alteration to the premises,
and the landlord would not have been liable if the traditional rule had been applied
since the supreme court held that the evidence did not support the jury's finding that
the landlord had retained control of the stairway. See text accompanying notes 66-
67 infra.
53. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 533, quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
23, § 27.16, at 1508. See note 61 infra and accompanying text. The court specifically
reviewed the tort immunities which had already been abolished in New Hampshire-
parental immunity, real estate vendor's immunity, and husband's immunity from his
wife. The Sargent court also recalled that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had
sharply criticized sovereign immunity and had refused to adopt charitable immunity.
Id. at ,308 A.2d at 533.
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abrogated as well. The court buttressed its holding by indicating that
the rejection of the doctrine of landlord tort immunity "springs nat-
urally and inexorably"54 from Kline v. Burns,55 which, by rejecting
the doctrine of caveat emptor and by finding an implied warranty
of habitability in dwelling leases, "discarded the very legal founda-
tion and justification for the landlord's immunity in tort for injuries
to the tenant or third persons."5  According to the court, since the
lessor owed a duty to make the premises reasonably suitable for their
intended use (the holding in Kline), there must also be a parallel
duty owed to the lessee to prevent or remedy negligently created safety
hazards. The inquiry, therefore, was shifted from the traditional de-
termination of control to a determination of whether this latter duty
had been breached by a failure to meet the standard of reasonable
care.
57
An unqualified reversal of the general rule of landlord tort im-
munity, 8 the Sargent decision is apparently the first case to specifically
54. N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 533.
55. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
56. N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 533-34.
57. Id. at , 308 A.2d at 532-33. The court indicated that the general tort rule
would be easier to apply than the previous rule of nonliability: "The emphasis on
control and other exceptions to the rule of nonliability, both at trial and on appeal,
unduly complicated the jury's task and diverted effort and attention from the central
issue of the unreasonableness of the risk." Id. at ,308 A.2d at 533.
58. Because Sargent abrogated a long-settled universal immunity, it might seem in-
equitable to apply the Sargent holding to landlords who had no reason to foresee that
they should meet the newly imposed general tort standard of care. The Sargent court
did not expressly discuss whether its decision should be applied only prospectively; in-
stead, the court applied its holding to the instant defendant. Since the New Hamp-
shire statute of limitations for personal injury actions is six years in duration, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (Supp. 1972), the Sargent court's decision leaves open the
possibility that, under the new standard, other landlords may be subjected to liability
for injuries that occurred several years before the Sargent decision.
In announcing the end of the rule of "caveat lessee," the court did state that
"[h]enceforth" landlords must exercise reasonable care. This phrasing could be con-
strued to indicate a prospective application. See Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich.
231, 234, 250, 111 N.W.2d -1, 2, 20 (1961) (opinion prospectively overruling municipal
tort immunity begins "from this date forward"). However, solely prospective applica-
tion of Sargent seems doubtful since the defendant was held liable.
The general rule in tort cases has been that judgments should be given retrospec-
tive effect because the major rationale for prospectivity-reliance by the parties on ex-
isting law-is not as significant in the tort area as in those areas where decisions have
more frequently been given purely prospective effect: contract, property, and criminal
law. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA.
L. REv. 201, 244 (1965) (discussion of prospective judgments and analysis of prospec-
tivity in tort cases). See also Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Stat-
utes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARv. L. RV. 437, 441-48
(1947) (discussion of prospectivity in contract, property, and criminal cases).
Retrospective application in the tort area was justified in Gelbman v. Gelbman,
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23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969), where the
court stated:
By abolishing the defense of intrafamily tort immunity for nonwillful
torts, we are not creating liability where none previously existed. Rather, we
are permitting recovery, previously denied, after the liability has been estab-
lished. We, therefore, conclude that the present decision should be applied
retrospectively to matters which have not gone to final judgment.
When municipal tort immunity was abolished in Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302 (Molitor 1), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared that relief for the plaintiff was necessary because the deci-
sion would otherwise be mere dictum and future plaintiffs would not be encouraged
to bring suits challenging other established rules. However, beyond the scope of the
instant case, the court felt that solely prospective effect was needed because school
districts and other municipalities had not insured or could not insure against the risks
of liability. The logical result of this reasoning in Molitor I would seem to be that
only one party (Thomas Molitor) could recover for injuries sustained in the school
bus accident underlying the case, while all the other injured children would be denied
relief. See id. at 42, 163 N.E.2d at 104 (dissenting opinion). But see id. at 43-44,
163 N.E.2d at 105 (concurring and dissenting opinion). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of Illinois subsequently held that these other children were entitled to prosecute
their tort claims arising out of the same bus accident. Molitor v. Kaneland Commu-
nity Unit Dist. No. 302 (Molitor 1I), 24 Ill. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962). In
the first phase of the Molitor litigation, several children sued at the same time as
Thomas Molitor. At the trial court's suggestion, these other plaintiffs merely filed
actions and then awaited the outcome of Thomas' suit. Id. at 468-69, 182 N.E.2d
at 146.
While there was no written stipulation that the rule applied in the Thomas
Molitor appeal would be the basis for determining the cases then pending
against defendant, the conduct of all parties and the trial court reveals that
it was commonly understood and accepted that [the supreme] court's ruling
on the dismissal of Thomas Molitor's claim would be the basis for determin-
ing the other claims arising out of the same bus accident and then pending
against defendant. Id. at 470, 182 N.E.2d 146.
The Molitor 11 court stressed that its decision
in no way modifies or affects our holding in the Molitor [1] case or the cut-
off date relative to governmental tort immunity as previously established in
that case . . . . We are dealing [in Molitor Il] only with claims which, as
clearly appears from the record now before us, the parties contemplated would
be adjudicated in accordance with the disposition of the claim of Thomas
Molitor. Id. at 470, 182 N.E.2d at 147.
On the other hand, the court in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111
N.W.2d 1 (1961), arrived at a truly prospective decision which denied relief to the
plaintiff but which abrogated municipal tort immunity for all future cases.
Although the Sargent court may be criticized for not announcing a clear rule on
this important question, a number of courts-when overruling long-standing tort im-
munities-have similarly failed to address themselves to the problem. See, e.g., Mus-
kopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961);
Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). Furthermore, the result of retro-
spective application does not appear to present great problems in the abrogation of
landlord tort immunity. The problem presented by the six-year statute of limitations
in New Hampshire is probably more theoretical than actual because it is doubtful that
a large number of cases remain unlitigated. Inasmuch as the landlord's immunity be-
fore Sargent was not absolute, previous plaintiffs were often able to prove liability
under one of the existing exceptions. The number and breadth of these exceptions
to the landlord's immunity in tort resulted in liability which, even before Sargent, pro-
vided considerable incentive for the landlord to obtain insurance and arguably put him
on notice that his immunity was not an absolute defense.
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abrogate this general immunity.59 The decision and its approach
59. In announcing that henceforth landlords must exercise reasonable care not to
subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm, the Sargent court cited four cases in
support of its holding.
First, in Scott v. Simons, 54 N.H. 426 (1874), the plaintiff tenants rented a cellar
in the defendant's building; because of a poorly constructed drain, water repeatedly
flowed back into the rented premises from a common sewer and damaged plaintiffs'
goods. After the defendant failed to make repairs requested by the plaintiffs, they
abandoned the premises and brought an action for damages. The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire required that a new trial be held to determine whether there
was any want of ordinary care on the part of the defendants in not providing
a suitable gate or other apparatus to prevent the flow of water from the sewer
into the drain, or in not repairing the breach within a reasonable time after
they had notice of it, or for any other reason. Id. at 430.
While this statement seems to approach the imposition of an ordinary negligence stand-
ard upon the defendant landlord, other statements in the opinion seem to indicate reli-
ance on the doctrine of "caveat lessee":
If the defendants on receiving this notice promised to repair the breach imme-
diately, that might justify the plaintiffs in continuing to occupy the premises,
and render the defendants liable for the subsequent injuries. Otherwise, it
must be held that the plaintiffs allowed their goods to remain there at their
peril, unless, by the relation of landlord and tenant, there was a duty imposed
on the defendants to repair the defect in the drain on receiving notice of it.
. . . But as there was no express contract, so it is well settled that none
can be implied by law, on the part of the defendants, to keep the leased prem-
ises in repair. Id. at 430-31.
Thus while the opinion in the Scott case may have implied utilization of an ordinary
negligence standard, it otherwise seemed to espouse continued adherence to the "caveat
lessee" doctrine; and the case has been cited as authority in subsequent decisions adher-
ing to the traditional approach. 'See Folsom v. Goodwin, 90 N.H. 467, 10 A.2d 666
(1940) (where landlord retained no control over part of demised premises and where
there was no evidence of warranty, fraud, or deceit, landlord was held to be under
no duty to keep such part in reasonable repair); Towne v. Thompson, 68 N.H. 317,
44 A. 492 (1895) (landlord not liable for lessee's injuries arising out of defective con-
dition or faulty construction of leased premises).
The holding in the second case cited by the Sargent court, Willcox v. Hines, 100
Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297 (1898), limited the imposition of a standard of reasonable
care to situations in which the landlord discovers hidden defects on the premises at
the time of the leasing. Thus Willcox was concerned only with an exception to the
general rule of landlord tort immunity.
In the third case, Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 386 P.2d 27 (1963), the Su-
preme Court of Arizona held that the landlord had a duty to disclose or repair hidden
defects at the time of the leasing. The fourth case cited in Sargent, Presson v. Moun-
tain States Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 176, 501 P.2d 17 (1972), was an action
by a tenant for injuries suffered by the tenant's child as a result of a defective water
heater. The Court of Appeals of Arizona initially analyzed the Presson case in general
tort liability terms and implied that the landlord was subject to a standard of reasonable
care. However, the actual holding may be considered more limited. Recognizing the
rule stated in Cummings, the Presson court indicated its approval of the implication
in Cummings concerning the "lack of wisdom in retaining caveat emptor." Id. at 179,
501 P.2d at 20. The Presson court broadened the Cummings rule to provide that the
landlord had a duty to repair "unreasonably dangerous" instrumentalities of which he
had actual knowledge and that he did not have the option merely to warn the tenant
of such defects. However, the court nonetheless indicated that the case should be re-
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have much merit. As the court stated, the rationale for the immunity
rule, which was rooted in conditions of agrarian England, has lost
much of its validity. 0° It is noteworthy that Sargent does not represent
such a sharp 'break with existing law when the case is viewed as
-another in a series of abrogations of immunities from tort liability,0"
when perceived as a further step in the elimination of the role of caveat
The determination of what constitutes an "unreasonably dangerous" instru-
mentality is a matter of fact for the jury and, on remand, if the jury concludes
that the water heater is in fact in that category, then, as a matter of law, the
landlord had a duty to repair which may have been breached if the facts
posed by the plaintiff are proven to be true, i.e., the defendant had actual
knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous condition before the injury occur-
red. Id. (emphasis added).
By indicating that the cause of the injury must be an "unreasonably dangerous" instru-
mentality and that the landlord may have had a duty to repair if he had actual
knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous condition, the court in Presson, like the
courts in the other cases cited as precedent for the Sargent decision, fell short
of imposing a general tort standard upon the landlord and abrogating the doctrine of
"caveat lessee."
60. See note 25 supra.
61. For an exhaustive discussion of the abrogation of various tort immunities, with
extensive lists of cases and jurisdictions, see W. PRossER AND J. WADE, ToRTs: CAsEs
AN MATERIALS 1105-26 (5th ed. 1971). The authors discuss, inter alia, the abroga-
tion of the tort immunities historically applied to family members, charities, and mu-
nicipalities.
In the area of family immunity, there are two categories (husband/wife and par-
ent/child) which immunize one family member from tort liability to the other. The
complete abrogation of family immunities was first advocated by Justice Harlan's dis-
senting opinion in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619-24 (1910). In subse-
quent years, seventeen jurisdictions have abrogated the husband/wife immunity by con-
struing the Married Women's Acts (which gave a married woman a separate legal iden-
tity and a separate legal estate in her own property) to remove all husband/wife im-
munity. W. PnossER & J. WADE, supra at 1109. The first case abrogating the parent/
child immunity came in 1963. See Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d
193 (1963). Within eight years, twelve jurisdictions followed the lead of Goller. W.
PRossER & J. WADE, supra at 1109.
In 1942, President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942), rejected the charitable immunity doctrine and started a major trend
of abrogation; at the present time, all but four jurisdictions (Maine, Massachusetts,
New Mexico, South Carolina) have abrogated this immunity in whole or in part. W.
PRossER & J. WADE, supra at 1114, 1116-17.
After the first decision abrogating municipal immunity, Hargrove v. Town of Co-
coa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), fifteen jurisdictions likewise rejected this im-
munity. W. PRossER & J. WADE, supra at 1124.
The analysis by Professors Prosser and Wade reveals that the abrogation of tort
immunities has been swift; the initial elimination of each immunity was followed by ab-
rogation in at least twelve to virtually all jurisdictions within approximately ten years.
See also 25 VAND. L REv. 623 (1972). For examples of additional jurisdictions that
have abrogated immunities, see Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97,
482 P.2d 968 (1971) (municipal immunity); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d
937 (1970) (municipal immunity); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971)
(parental immunity).
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emptor in the landlord-tenant relationship,6 2 or when compared to
the recent developments in tort law dealing with the sale of chattels."
Also, since the tort immunity rule for lessors has never been absolute
but has always been subject to exceptions,64 Sargent cannot be viewed
as causing an overwhelming increase in the liability of lessors gen-
erally.
The Sargent holding does remedy many of the problems in-
herent in the conventional immunity doctrine. First, the new rule is
a major stride toward eliminating situations where neither the land-
lord nor the tenant is responsible for dangerous conditions on leased
premises.65 Second, it eliminates a practical problem resulting from
application of the traditional rule, inasmuch as landlords, under the
traditional rule, are deterred from making repairs by the fact that
their actions may be seen as incidents of continuing control, which
may result in the imposition of liability if injury occurs.66 Repairs were
also discouraged heretofore by the fact that if the landlord per-
formed them negligently, he could be held liable.6 7  Third, as the Sar-
gent court observed, determining lessor liability -by means of the stand-
ard of reasonable care, instead of limiting liability to cases in which an
exception to the general immunity can be found, makes the judicial
determination of liability simpler and more consistent, especially for the
jury;68 the initial inquiry under the Sargent standard will be whether the
landlord acted as a reasonable man rather than whether the particular
fact situation can be seen to fit within an established exception. Fourth,
imposition of the tort liability test of reasonable care should produce
an improvement in the safety conditions of leased premises, since land-
lords will have more reason to fear liability resulting from foreseeable
dangers or defects on leased premises.
At the same time, however, it is possible that the Sargent ration-
62. See notes 35-44 supra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897
(1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also Jaeger, Products Liability: The Construc-
tive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 501 (1964); Prosser, Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 32 Am. TRTAL L.J. 1 (1968); Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
64. See notes 26-34 supra and accompanying text.
65. See N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 532. See note 52 supra and accompanying
text.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 13, 127 A.2d 45 (1956);
Karen v. Hans, 32 Misc. 2d 894, 222 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1961).
67. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
68. N.H. at , 308 A.2d at 533.
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ale may restrict the availability of inexpensive rental housing. Faced
with the prospect of remedying potential hazards in leased premises,
landlords of low-income, dilapidated rental property may choose to re-
move it from the market, since the cost of the repairs necessary to avoid
the expanded tort liability may exceed the amount that some owners of
marginal housing can afford,6 9 and especially since rental income prob-
ably would be least in buildings which need the most repairs. Reduc-
tions in the availability of low-income housing, coupled with the pos-
sibility that landlords will pass on repair expenses to tenants, may
cause an increase in the cost of housing for low-income tenantsY° In.
addition, the expanded tort liability may lead landlords to purchase
more liability insurance, another cost which may ultimately be passed
on to lessees.
Thus it is difficult to ascertain whether the net impact of the Sar-
gent decision will be a positive or a negative one. Since the modem
lessee probably is much less able than either his feudal counterpart or
69. In other situations where landlords of low-income housing have been forced
to make building repairs, abandonment of real property has become a significant prob-
lem. Recently buildings in many metropolitan areas have been abandoned by landlords
who cannot afford to maintain the property because the cost of repairs makes the build-
ings unprofitable. See generally In the Inner Cities: Acres of Abandoned Buildings,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 26, 1970, at 54-56. For an early prediction of this
result, see Eldridge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 467,
490) (1936).
Boston Housing Court Judge Paul C. Garrity, concerned with the future of city
neighborhoods, recently noted that the small landlord may no longer be able to func-
tion because of rent controls, a lack of money available for loans, and "a housing
court that will penalize him for failure to repair." The result of these factors, he
indicated, was not only a decrease in housing, but a reduction in the number of small
landlords. Boston Globe, Nov. 19, 1973 (column and page unavailable).
70. Government statistics, BUREAU OF CENSUS OF U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970
CENSUS OF HOUSING, SUBJECr REPORTS: HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS BY HOUSEHOLD
CoMPosrroN, Table A-2, at 15-16 (1973), indicate that lower-income groups in gen-
eral pay a higher percentage of their income for rent than higher-income groups. The
Table sets out figures for gross rent paid by household heads, who are classified in
five income groups: (1) less than $4,000, (2) $4,000-$6,999, (3) $7,000-$9,999, (4)
$10,000-$14,999,, and (5) $15,000 or more. The median rent for these groups is $84,
$102, $115, $133, and $165, respectively. While there is substantial variation in the
amount of rent paid within each income group, calculations using the median rent fig-
ures for each group and both the highest and lowest income figure from each group
indicate that gross rent of renter-occupied housing units as a percentage of 1969 income
is for each group: (1) at least 25%, (2) 30% to 17%, (3) 20% to 14%, (4) 16%
to 10%, and (5) at most 13%%, respectively. These figures are not intended as
absolute representations; for example, 1,028,112 out of 7,143,943 households in the less-
than-$4,000-per-year income group pay less than $50 per month in rent, or less than
15% of total income at the $4,000 level. However, in the aggregate it appears that
lower-income groups do spend a larger amount for rent in relation to their income
than do higher-income groups.
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the modem lessor to discover and remedy defective conditions in leased
premises, abolition of the doctrine of "caveat lessee" does seem to place
liability more squarely upon the persons most able to avoid the harm.
Moreover, even if increased rentals and a contracted housing supply
do offset the potential reduction in injury to tenants made possible by
Sargent, at least the ultimate cost of injuries resulting from negligence
will be distributed more widely among lessees as a class, rather than
being borne, often catastrophically, by a small number of unfortunate
tenants. 71  Whatever the practical impact of the Sargent decision, it
does serve to bring the tort liability of landlords into line with general
tort principles and is another in a growing series of cases in which tort
immunity for a particular class of persons is abolished. As such, it seems
quite likely that the Sargent holding will be rapidly adopted in other
jurisdictions over the coming decade.72
71. This line of reasoning has been utilized in the area of products liability. For
example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
the court stated:
Thus, where commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they
will be dangerous to life or limb, then society's interests can only be pro-
tected by eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his
dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer. In that way the bur-
den of losses consequent upon the use of defective articles is borne by those
who are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable dis-
tribution of the losses when they do occur. Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.
Justice Traynor stressed the importance of these factors two years later in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962):
The purpose of such [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries re-
sulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
See also Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
72. In the case of other immunities, after the immunity was abrogated in one juris-
diction, at least twelve other jurisdictions followed suit within approximately ten years.
See note 61 supra. Both this fact and the fact that ten other jurisdictions have found
an implied warranty of habitability (see note 44 supra), a warranty from which the
Sargent court said its holding flowed naturally, support the prediction that the land-
lord's immunity in tort will be abrogated in other jurisdictions in the near future.
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